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Lerner; there is no guarantee that the accommodation did not
extend to the substance of the response. We are not convinced
that Mr. Jouannet gave his response as a “disinterested” party.
Moreover, Mr. Jouannet’s response is not contemporaneous with
CDR’s transaction with the Ackerman group.
We also are not persuaded that Mr. Jouannet’s response is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence that petitioner could have procured through
reasonable efforts.226 Although the record reflects that Mr.
Jouannet was the principal negotiator on the CDR side of the
transaction, we are not convinced that other individuals at CDR,
Generale Bank, or CLIS could not have testified regarding the
intentions of the banks.
Finally, petitioner points to the fact that Mr. Jouannet is
deceased and is unavailable to testify as a basis for admitting
the response. We are not persuaded that rule 807 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence contemplates admitting hearsay evidence solely
on the basis that the declarant is deceased. See Estate of
Temple v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 776 (1976). We are not persuaded
that the general purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
226 The requirement that “the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts” requires a
consideration of two factors: (1) The availability of other
evidence on a particular point; and (2) whether such other
evidence can be procured through reasonable efforts. Goldsmith
v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1134, 1141 (1986).
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