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adoption of the AMT. In many different contexts, literal
application of the AMT has led to a perceived hardship, but
challenges based on equity have been uniformly rejected. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Commissioner, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-51; Okin v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 1338
(9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-199; Warfield v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 179 (1985); Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 742, 747-753 (1984); Prosman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1999-87; Klaassen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-241, affd.
without published opinion 182 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1999).
In Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir.
2001), affg. 114 T.C. 399 (2000), the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit commented:
it is not a feasible judicial undertaking to achieve
global equity in taxation * * * especially when the
means suggested for eliminating one inequity (that
which Kenseth argues is created by the alternative
minimum income tax) consists of creating another
inequity (differential treatment for purposes of that
tax of fixed and contingent legal fees). And if it
were a feasible judicial undertaking, it still would
not be a proper one, equity in taxation being a
political rather than a jural concept. * * *
Most recently, in Commissioner v. Banks, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct.
826 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the issue of
the effect of the AMT on cases such as Kenseth v. Commissioner,
supra, involving the deductibility of attorney’s fees, has
partially been addressed by Congress. We believe that here, too,
the solution must be with Congress.
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