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and 11 days in 1999 and 2000, respectively, hardly constitutes
classifying it as his primary personal residence.
At trial, petitioner provided conflicting testimony about
his intent with regard to the condominium. First, petitioner
testified that the condominium was his “second home” when he
owned the Aurora home, then it was his “home” after he sold the
Aurora home, and, finally, it was his “retirement home”. Thus,
we are unable to conclude that the condominium was his home in
the real and substantial sense before he left for Australia,
during his stay in Australia, and after his return from
Australia.
Petitioner argues, however, that he paid living expenses for
both the condominium and the apartments in Australia during the
relevant time period. We decline to find that the expenses
petitioner paid with regard to the condominium constitute
duplicate living expenses. At all times, the condominium has
always been petitioner’s rental property, which he reports as
such on Schedule E. Petitioner continued to pay the same
management fees since he has owned the condominium, including
during the time he resided in the Aurora home and in Australia.
These expenses constitute investment expenses in rental property
rather than “substantial continuing living expenses” for purposes
of section 162(a)(2). Simply put, petitioner’s labeling of the
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