Nancy J. Vincent - Page 13

                                       - 13 -                                         
          held that this allocation did not control the taxability of the             
          settlement proceeds, noting that the settlement was “uncontested,           
          nonadversarial, and entirely tax motivated.”  Robinson v.                   
          Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 129.  We find this language equally               
          applicable to the present case.7                                            
               While the underlying litigation was adversarial, once                  
          Whittier agreed to a settlement amount and negotiated the                   
          inclusion of the indemnification and release of liability                   
          clauses, the negotiation as to the characterization of the                  
          settlement proceeds ceased to be adversarial.  Petitioner wanted            
          a large portion of the recovery connected to a tortlike personal            
          injury so that she could avoid taxes under section 104(a)(2).8              
          Whittier, conversely, had no adversarial interest in the                    
          classification of the settlement proceeds as it was indemnified             
          from any adverse tax consequences arising from the settlement.              



               7 We also find Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116                  
          (1994), affd. in part and revd. in part on an issue not relevant            
          herein 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), inapt given the fact that it             
          was decided under sec. 104(a)(2) as it read before the 1996                 
          amendment.  Before amendment, that section arguably included                
          mental anguish as a personal injury.  The section, as amended,              
          explicitly limits its application to “physical” injuries, thereby           
          excluding purely emotional distress.                                        
               8 We note that the total amount of the court judgment was              
          $584,350.76 (including court-awarded attorney’s fees and costs).            
          The matter was settled for $510,000.  This $74,350.76 reduction             
          is almost exactly 30 percent of $240,000, approximating                     
          petitioner’s expected tax benefit from the settlement as                    
          structured.                                                                 





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011