Anthony and Lena C. Andre - Page 12

                                       - 12 -                                         
               We therefore conclude that premature requests for a CDP                
          hearing are not effective.3                                                 
               The Andres’ alternative argument is that the defect in their           
          request doesn’t matter because the notice of determination covers           
          1990-94 anyway.  This rests too heavily on what seems to have               
          been a typo.  We have consistently held that if the IRS did not             
          make a determination about a specific tax year under section                
          6330, “the absence of a determination is grounds for dismissal of           
          a petition regarding such period.”  Lister v. Commissioner, T.C.            
          Memo. 2003-17; see also Offiler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 492,              
          498 (2000).                                                                 
               In this case, the notice of determination’s summary and                
          recommendation begins by stating “You requested a hearing with              
          Appeals under the provisions of IRC � 6320 as to the                        
          appropriateness of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.”  It ends with             
          “[t]he Notice of Federal Tax Lien is sustained.”  There is                  
          nowhere a mention of the NIL for tax years 1990-94.                         
               We therefore conclude that the Commissioner had no                     
          obligation to grant the Andres a CDP hearing and issue a                    


               3 There is one small category of premature requests which              
          the Commissioner himself regards as valid--those made during the            
          five-day period after a taxpayer is sent a NFTL, but before the             
          30-day period under section 6320 begins to run.  See sec.                   
          301.6320-1(c)(2), Q&A-C3, Proced. & Admin. Regs.  He treats these           
          premature requests, much like premature notices of appeal, as               
          filed on the first day of the 30-day period.  The Andres’ case              
          does not fall into this category.                                           





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011