- 17 -
against his home because of his disability. See sec.
301.7122-1(c)(3)(iii), Examples (1), (2), and (3), Proced. &
Admin. Regs. None of these examples bears any resemblance to
this case but instead “describe more dire circumstances”. Speltz
v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d at 786.
Nor have petitioners articulated with any specificity the
purported economic hardship they will suffer if they are not
allowed to compromise their liability for $83,213. Petitioners
have given us no reason to disagree with the essence of Cochran’s
determination that petitioners’ health does not render them
“incapable of earning a living”, nor have we reason to conclude
that petitioners’ “financial resources will be exhausted
providing for care and support during the course of the
condition”.9 Sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3)(i)(A), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
We also are mindful that any decision by Cochran to accept
petitioners’ offer-in-compromise to promote effective tax
administration must be viewed against the backdrop of section
301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. That section
requires that Cochran deny petitioners’ offer if her acceptance
of it would undermine voluntary compliance with tax laws by
9 We also note that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 710 (9th Cir.
2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13, dismissed a similar claim of
economic hardship advanced by the taxpayers there. Petitioners
here, like the taxpayers in Fargo, have substantial assets and
future income potential and can afford to pay their tax liability
in full.
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