- 17 - against his home because of his disability. See sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3)(iii), Examples (1), (2), and (3), Proced. & Admin. Regs. None of these examples bears any resemblance to this case but instead “describe more dire circumstances”. Speltz v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d at 786. Nor have petitioners articulated with any specificity the purported economic hardship they will suffer if they are not allowed to compromise their liability for $83,213. Petitioners have given us no reason to disagree with the essence of Cochran’s determination that petitioners’ health does not render them “incapable of earning a living”, nor have we reason to conclude that petitioners’ “financial resources will be exhausted providing for care and support during the course of the condition”.9 Sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3)(i)(A), Proced. & Admin. Regs. We also are mindful that any decision by Cochran to accept petitioners’ offer-in-compromise to promote effective tax administration must be viewed against the backdrop of section 301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. That section requires that Cochran deny petitioners’ offer if her acceptance of it would undermine voluntary compliance with tax laws by 9 We also note that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13, dismissed a similar claim of economic hardship advanced by the taxpayers there. Petitioners here, like the taxpayers in Fargo, have substantial assets and future income potential and can afford to pay their tax liability in full.Page: Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Next
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