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practice before the Tax Court.” Second, petitioner argues that
the experience of its counsel, “and his detailed familiarity with
a number of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, enables him
to handle litigation before the Tax Court with a far greater
efficiency based on time expended than all but a handful of tax
attorneys.”
Respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to an
enhanced fee beyond the statutory rate because the factual nature
of the issue in Caspian I does not justify the enhanced rate. We
agree with respondent.
General expertise in tax law in itself is not a special
factor warranting a fee award in excess of the statutory rate
under section 7430. Huffman v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 1150
(9th Cir. 1992), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1991-
144; Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457, 489 (1993), affd. in
part, revd. in part and remanded on another issue 43 F.3d 172
(5th Cir. 1995). Depending on the facts and circumstances of the
case, however, we may find that a tax attorney had a special
skill and expertise needful for the litigation in question.
Powers v. Commissioner, supra.
Although the issues presented in Caspian I may have required
petitioner to secure the services of a competent tax attorney,
this finding, standing alone, does not demonstrate the presence
of a special factor which would justify an increased award under
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