Estate of Sarah M. Davenport, Deceased, Richard Davenport, Executor - Page 15

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          estate at trial sought to introduce testimony directed towards              
          the intent of the signatories to the settlement agreement.                  
          Respondent raised a continuing objection to such testimony under            
          the parol evidence rule.  The Court reserved ruling on the matter           
          and will now overrule respondent’s objection.                               
               Stemming from the well-established principle that State law            
          creates legal rights and property interests while Federal law               
          determines how the rights and interests so created shall be                 
          taxed, Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940), this              
          Court looks to the relevant State’s parol evidence rule in                  
          deciding whether to exclude extrinsic evidence concerning the               
          rights created under a written instrument.  Estate of Craft v.              
          Commissioner, 68 T.C. 249, 263 (1977), affd. per curiam 608 F.2d            
          240 (5th Cir. 1979).  The settlement agreement here was executed            
          in Michigan and provides in paragraph 12.0 that it is to be                 
          “construed and interpreted in accordance with the law of the                
          State of Michigan.”  Hence, we look to Michigan’s parol evidence            
          rule.                                                                       
               Use of the parol evidence rule to ascertain the intent of              
          the parties to a contract has long provenance in Michigan.  As              
          early stated by the Supreme Court of Michigan:                              
               We must look for the intent of the parties in the words                
               used in the instrument.  This court does not have the                  
               right to make a different contract for the parties or                  
               to look to extrinsic testimony to determine their                      
               intent when the words used by them are clear and                       






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