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and, because petitioner did not appeal the award, the order was
enforceable in its own right. “An order to pay attorney’s fees
is * * * more than a judgement for money; it is a personal order
to the spouse.” Minor v. Minor, supra at 165-166. Because the
order to pay Mr. Dubin was a personal order to petitioner, even
if Ms. Devers had predeceased payment, the order would still have
been valid, petitioner’s obligation to pay $5,000 would have
survived, and Mr. Dubin would have had his own cause of action to
collect directly from petitioner. The fact that the case giving
rise to the PDL in discussion did not result in a final
dissolution of the marriage is irrelevant for the inquiry at
hand.
3. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court of Missouri has not addressed the
narrow legal issue presented in the instant case, the State’s
statutory scheme of the child support, maintenance, and attorney
fee provisions, as well as relevant caselaw, suggests that
petitioner’s obligation to Mr. Dubin would not have terminated
had Ms. Devers died before satisfaction of the obligation whether
or not the PDL was ever followed by a Final Order and Decree of
Dissolution. For that reason, and after considering all of the
facts and circumstances, we hold that petitioner’s deduction of
the $5,000 paid to Mr. Dubin was improper as it did not meet the
definition of “alimony” under section 71(b)(D).
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Last modified: May 25, 2011