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remaining nontest case petitioners.26 Accordingly, the relevant
inquiry is not whether petitioners paid or incurred the claimed
fees and expenses, but whether the real parties in interest who
did pay or incur those amounts satisfy the net worth requirement
26 It could be argued that only those nontest case
petitioners who are bound by the outcome of this litigation,
i.e., those who entered into piggyback agreements, should be
considered real parties in interest. Cf. Mearkle v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1256, 1261 & n.6 (1988) (refusing to fully
reimburse petitioners’ claimed litigation costs when those costs
clearly related to cases of similarly situated taxpayers--Amway
distributors--as well; Court notes that “this case is not a ‘test
case’ which the parties and the Court agree to litigate in order
to resolve an issue affecting many other taxpayers who agree to
be bound by the result therein”). (Emphasis added.) However, in
Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-90 (Dixon VI), we observe
that “the parties have agreed--and properly so--that the sanction
[imposed in Dixon VI] applies to benefit not only the test case
petitioners, but also to nontest case petitioners in all
remaining docketed cases in the Kersting project, whether or not
they signed piggyback agreements.” (Emphasis added.) We
similarly draw no distinction between piggybackers and non-
piggybackers for purposes of our real party in interest analysis.
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