- 9 - some of the facts in this case support the imposition of the penalty. For example, the February order refers only to child support, and the above-quoted portion of the divorce decree establishes that petitioner’s former spouse waived any right to alimony or spousal support. We assume that petitioner was well aware of this as the divorce decree expressly states that he was advised by counsel during the divorce proceedings. Be that as it may, he claimed an alimony deduction. On the other hand, we do not view the deduction here in dispute to be one that “would seem to a reasonable and prudent person to be ‘too good to be true’ under the circumstances”. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Furthermore, other than the nature of petitioner’s employment, the record contains nothing about his “knowledge, experience and education”, sec. 1.6664-4(b), Income Tax Regs., that would have relevance to the imposition of the penalty. Similarly, the record fails to disclose how petitioner treated support payments made in prior years on his Federal income tax returns for those years. The absence of such information, coupled with references to “child and spousal support” (emphasis added) in the stipulation of facts and May order, undermines respondent’s position that the impositionPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011