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In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
supra, the Supreme Court enunciated the following two-part
analysis applicable to judicial review of an agency’s
construction of a statute:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. [Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., supra at 842-843; fn. refs. and citations
omitted.]
In the case before us, we conclude it is unnecessary to
attempt to discern any substantive difference between Natl.
Muffler Dealers Association and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. because we
conclude the result here would be the same under either standard.
See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 131
(2006).
In evaluating the validity of section 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i),
GST Tax Regs., we first consider whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. Inasmuch as TRA 1986
section 1433(b)(2)(A) does not define the phrase “transfer under
a trust”, we do not believe that Congress has directly spoken to
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