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respondent contends that this case should be dismissed as moot.9
For the reasons described below, we agree.
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction; we may
exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly authorized by
Congress. See, e.g., Henry Randolph Consulting v. Commissioner,
112 T.C. 1, 4 (1999). Our jurisdiction in this case is
predicated upon section 6330(d)(1)(A), which gives the Tax Court
jurisdiction “with respect to such matter” as is covered by the
final determination in a requested hearing before the Appeals
Office. See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37 (2000).
“Thus, our jurisdiction is defined by the scope of the
determination” that the Appeals officer is required to make.
Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 25 (2005).
The Appeals officer’s written determination is expected to
address “the issues presented by the taxpayer and considered at
the hearing.” H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 266 (1998), 1998-3 C.B.
9 Neither party originally argued that this case was moot as
to petitioner’s taxable year 1992. Mootness, however, “is a
jurisdictional question, since article III, section 2 of the
Constitution limits jurisdiction of the Federal judicial system
to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Hefti v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.
180, 191 (1991), affd. 983 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1993). “The
failure to question our jurisdiction is not a waiver of the right
to do so, for if we lack jurisdiction over an issue, we do not
have the power to decide it.” Urbano v. Commissioner, 122 T.C.
384, 389 (2004). Accordingly, the Court has an independent
obligation to consider mootness sua sponte. North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). For this reason, the Court
directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the
issue of whether this case should be dismissed as moot.
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