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deposit”). Petitioner also testified that the Strong account he
opened was not an IRA account even though he stipulated to the
contrary, the documentary evidence is to the contrary, and he
testified that he sent the money from Mellon Bank to Strong as an
IRA direct transfer.
Under the circumstances, we are not required to, and
generally do not, rely on petitioner’s testimony to sustain his
burden of establishing error in respondent’s determinations. See
Lerch v. Commissioner, supra; Geiger v. Commissioner, supra;
Tokarski v. Commissioner, supra. The Court is not required to
accept petitioner’s unsubstantiated testimony. See Wood v.
Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964), affg. 41 T.C.
593 (1964). The Court need not accept at face value a witness’s
testimony that is self-interested or otherwise questionable. See
Archer v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1955), affg.
a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Weiss v. Commissioner, 221
F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1955), affg. T.C. Memo. 1954-51;
Schroeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-467.
There is no evidence that petitioner filed Forms 8606. The
evidence does not establish the initial source of the funds in
the Janus IRA or that petitioner has any basis (“investment in
the contract”) in the Janus IRA. Accordingly, we sustain
respondent’s determination regarding petitioner’s IRA
distributions for 2001.
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