- 14 -
contend that respondent arbitrarily refused to accept their
proposed installment agreement and subsequent offer-in-
compromise, opting instead to proceed with a levy. They contend
that they could not agree to the Appeals officer's proposed
installment agreement because they lacked the financial resources
and borrowing capacity to fulfill the terms of that agreement.
Moreover, they contend that the formula used by respondent to
determine the acceptable amount of an installment agreement or an
acceptable offer-in-compromise failed to account adequately for
petitioners' age, earning capacity, and poor financial
circumstances. Finally, they assert that respondent's
determination to proceed with a levy does not balance the need
for efficient collection with their legitimate concern that the
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary, see sec.
6330(c)(3)(C), and accordingly is arbitrary and capricious.9
As petitioners have not challenged the validity of the
underlying tax liability, we review respondent's determination to
proceed with collection for abuse of discretion. Jones v.
9 In the petition, petitioners also assert that respondent's
actions were "unduly punitive" in violation of petitioners'
Eighth Amendment rights. They do not mention this claim in their
opposition to respondent's motion for summary judgment, and we
deem it abandoned. See Bradley v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 367,
370 (1993); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 344
(1991); Rybak v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988). In
any event, petitioners have not cited, and we are unaware of, any
authority suggesting that, where a taxpayer concedes that unpaid
taxes are due, the Commissioner's decision to collect those taxes
by means of his power to levy may violate the Eighth Amendment.
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