- 6 - According to petitioner, his residence during 2003 constituted the principal place of abode for both of his children for more than one-half of 2003. Petitioner testified that during 2003, the children were with him for more days than suggested in the schedule set forth in the separation agreement. Ms. DiBiccari, who was called as a witness by respondent, agreed that the schedule set forth in the separation agreement was not honored during 2003, but she testified that the children were at petitioner’s residence for fewer days than suggested in the agreement. When questioned by petitioner during cross- examination regarding her proof on this point she responded: “Well, I guess it’s my word against yours”. As far as the parties are concerned, the resolution of this factual dispute effectively resolves the contested issues in this case. Apparently, the parties expect that the word “principal,” as used in the phrase “principal place of abode” in the above- cited sections should be construed or defined with reference to time spent at competing locations; i.e., the residence where the children spent the majority of the year constitutes their principal place of abode. Although this is not an unreasonable expectation, under the circumstances, placing the children at the residence of either parent on any given day during 2003 is neither determinative nor illustrative, and is therefore unnecessary.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011