- 6 -
According to petitioner, his residence during 2003
constituted the principal place of abode for both of his children
for more than one-half of 2003. Petitioner testified that during
2003, the children were with him for more days than suggested in
the schedule set forth in the separation agreement. Ms.
DiBiccari, who was called as a witness by respondent, agreed that
the schedule set forth in the separation agreement was not
honored during 2003, but she testified that the children were at
petitioner’s residence for fewer days than suggested in the
agreement. When questioned by petitioner during cross-
examination regarding her proof on this point she responded:
“Well, I guess it’s my word against yours”.
As far as the parties are concerned, the resolution of this
factual dispute effectively resolves the contested issues in this
case. Apparently, the parties expect that the word “principal,”
as used in the phrase “principal place of abode” in the above-
cited sections should be construed or defined with reference to
time spent at competing locations; i.e., the residence where the
children spent the majority of the year constitutes their
principal place of abode. Although this is not an unreasonable
expectation, under the circumstances, placing the children at the
residence of either parent on any given day during 2003 is
neither determinative nor illustrative, and is therefore
unnecessary.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011