- 8 - circumstances. Yoakum v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 128, 140 (1984); Beard v. Commissioner, supra at 1284. Finally, it is well settled that State courts by their decisions cannot determine issues of Federal tax law. See Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Neal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-97; Nieto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-296. Although paragraph 11 of the divorce decree labeled the mortgage payments “in the nature of support”, paragraph 8 specifically stated that “Maintenance is denied to each party”. It thus appears that the mortgage payments are not alimony or separate maintenance payments. Petitioner admitted that the intent and purpose of paragraph 11 was to protect Ms. Picou from becoming personally liable for the mortgages in the event that he filed for bankruptcy. Clearly, Ms. Picou had no interest in the Lakewood home after the divorce: she relinquished her interest in the Lakewood home by quitclaim deed as part of the divorce action in exchange for the guarantee that petitioner would pay the mortgages and expeditiously refinance the mortgages in his name alone to extinguish any continuing personal liability that she might have on the mortgages. Under these circumstances, the provision in respect to the mortgage payments appears to be more in the nature of a property settlement. In any event, we are not persuaded that the mortgage payments conferred a benefit on Ms. Picou by virtue of relievingPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
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