Homer L. Richardson - Page 50

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               The first prong of the above fraud test mandates that                  
          respondent prove the existence of an underpayment of tax for each           
          year.  In doing so, respondent may not simply rely on the                   
          taxpayer’s failure to prove error in the deficiency                         
          determination.  DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 873; Otsuki v.              
          Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 106 (1969).  Here, the evidence leaves            
          no doubt that substantial taxable income was generated through              
          Mr. Richardson’s efforts in selling Aegis trusts.  The totality             
          of the record also clearly establishes that the entities that               
          petitioners attempted to interpose between themselves and those             
          receipts were not worthy of credence.  Petitioners failed to                
          include that income on their 1996 and 1997 returns and, as a                
          result, underpaid their taxes.  Petitioners’ quibbles over                  
          various details and amounts notwithstanding, respondent has in              
          any event shown by clear and convincing evidence the essential              
          elements of the scenario which led to underpayments of tax.                 
               B.  Fraudulent Intent                                                  
               The second prong of the fraud test requires respondent to              
          show that a portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud.           
          Fraud for this purpose is defined as intentional wrongdoing on              
          the part of the taxpayer, with the specific purpose of avoiding a           
          tax believed to be owed.  Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d              
          1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1968); Webb v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 366,              
          377 (5th Cir. 1968), affg. T.C. Memo. 1966-81; Powell v.                    
          Granquist, 252 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1958).  Stated differently,            




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