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2002, to December 10, 2005. The resolution of whether petitioner
was “disabled” within the meaning of section 72(m)(7) now turns
upon a narrow question of fact--whether petitioner’s injuries
were temporary or indefinite?
There is a dearth of cases interpreting and analyzing the
term “indefinite” under section 72(m)(7) and section 1.72-
17A(f)(3), Income Tax Regs. There is, however, in the context of
a taxpayer who seeks deductions for certain expenses incurred
while away from home under section 162(a)(2), a well-established
body of caselaw that has analyzed and contrasted the concepts of
“temporary” and “indefinite”. See Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358
U.S. 59, 60-61 (1958); Neal v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 1157, 1159
(9th Cir. 1982) (following Kasun v. United States, 671 F.2d 1059
(7th Cir. 1982)), affg. T.C. Memo. 1981-407; Stricker v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 355, 361-362 (1970), affd. 438 F.2d 1216
(6th Cir. 1971). They lend guidance to the interpretation of
“indefinite” in this case.
An employment is for an indefinite duration if its
termination is not foreseeable or is not reasonably expected to
be foreseen within a fixed or reasonably short period of time.
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 578, 581-582 (1980); Stricker
v. Commissioner, supra at 361; White v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1984-128; Duley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-262.
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