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brief, petitioner suggests that the Court of Appeals knowingly
wrote its opinion in Fargo in such a way as to distinguish that
case from the cases of counsel’s similarly situated clients
(e.g., petitioner), and to otherwise allow those clients’
liabilities for penalties and interest to be forgiven. We do not
read the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Fargo to support that
conclusion. See Keller v. Commissioner, supra; Barnes v.
Commissioner, supra.
Respondent’s rejection of petitioner’s longstanding case
argument was not arbitrary or capricious.
2. The IRM Example
Petitioner argues that respondent erred when he determined
that petitioner was not entitled to relief based on the second
example in IRM section 5.8.11.2.2(3). Petitioner asserts that
many of the facts in this case were not present in the example,
and, therefore, any reliance on the example was misplaced.
Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive.
IRM section 5.8.11.2.2(3) discusses effective tax
administration offers-in-compromise based on equity and public
policy grounds and states in the second example:
In 1983, the taxpayer invested in a nationally marketed
partnership which promised the taxpayer tax benefits
far exceeding the amount of the investment.
Immediately upon investing, the taxpayer claimed
investment tax credits that significantly reduced or
eliminated the tax liabilities for the years 1981
through 1983. In 1984, the IRS opened an audit of the
partnership under the provisions of the Tax Equity and
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