- 16 -
Whether to permit such an amendment to conform pleadings to the
evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court.
E.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Long, 304 F.2d 136, 142-144 (9th
Cir. 1962); Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 172, 178
(1998); Bhattacharyya v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-19. It is
well settled both that amendment under Rule 41 may be allowed at
any time in a Tax Court proceeding through entry of decision and
that an affirmative defense may properly be pleaded through the
vehicle of a motion to conform under Rule 41(b)(1). E.g.,
Commissioner v. Finley, 265 F.2d 885, 888 (10th Cir. 1959), affg.
O’Shea v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1957-15 and T.C. Memo. 1957-
16; LeFever v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 525, 538 & n.16 (1994),
affd. 100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996); Stromsted v. Commissioner,
53 T.C. 330, 340 & n.5 (1969); Pierce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2003-188.
The touchstone in evaluating whether to allow an amendment
to conform pleadings to the evidence is the existence of unfair
surprise or prejudice to the nonmoving party. E.g., Foman v.
Davis, supra at 182; Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, supra at
178-180; Kroh v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383, 387-389 (1992);
Markwardt v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 989, 998 (1975); Bhattacharyya
v. Commissioner, supra; Pierce v. Commissioner, supra. Such
surprise or prejudice, in turn, rests largely on evidentiary and
other considerations bearing on the nonmovant’s opportunity to
Page: Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Next
Last modified: November 10, 2007