Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP, Robert Shore, Steven Fisher Gregory Miles and Scott McMillan, Partners Other Than Tax Matters Partner - Page 9



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               If respondent’s position in this proceeding is correct, the            
          FPAA was sent within the 6-year period of limitations, and the              
          FPAA, by reason of section 6229(d), would suspend the period of             
          limitations applicable to assessment of the liabilities of the              
          partners.  If we adopt petitioners’ position in this case, the              
          applicability of the period of limitations requires analysis of             
          the situation of each partner, i.e., whether the partner’s tax              
          year is open to assessment.  If the period of limitations is open           
          with respect to any partner in the partnership, the adjustments             
          made in the FPAA in issue would have to be examined on the                  
          merits.  However, the parties have stipulated that they know of             
          no other exceptions to the normal 3-year period with respect to             
          the individual partners, and respondent has conceded that, if the           
          Court determines that petitioners’ failure to include net gain              
          from the sale of property does not constitute an omission from              
          gross income, the Court should grant petitioners’ motion for                
          summary judgment.                                                           
               Although section 6229 does not repeat all of the terms and             
          provisions already set forth in section 6501, the precedents                
          interpreting section 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) have been held equally               
          applicable to section 6229(c)(2), and that principle is not                 
          disputed here.  In this case, however, respondent implies that an           
          interpretation under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 should not           
          apply to the current Code provisions.                                       







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