Richard L. Clark - Page 5
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failed to present any evidence of his deductions at the time of
trial or during the month after trial that he was permitted to
provide further information, after having received suggestions as
to how his required records could be reconstructed. Although he
relies on Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir.
1930), he provided no basis for making an estimate of deductions
to which he might be entitled, which precludes our estimating
such deductions. See, e.g., Mendes v. Commissioner, 121 T.C.
308, 316 (2003); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743
(1985). We have no reason to believe that petitioner’s allowable
deductions exceeded the standard deductions allowed in the
statutory notices of deficiency.
Petitioner testified that he was divorced in 2002. There is
no information in the record as to whether his former spouse
filed tax returns for the years in issue. There is no evidence
concerning any eligible dependents that he or his former spouse
might have had. There is nothing in the record to contradict the
“single” filing status used in the statutory notice for 2002. If
petitioner was married in 2001, which is unclear from the record,
he was not disadvantaged by the use of “single” status rather
than “married filing separately”.
On the other hand, respondent neglected to secure third-
party records that corroborate the income set forth in the
statutory notices. So far as the record reflects, despite
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Last modified: November 10, 2007