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“represents the sum to compensate Christina Connelly [sic] for
the alleged emotional distress suffered by her”. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The settlement agreement also released Associates from all
claims known or unknown that were asserted or could have been
asserted against Associates under Federal or State law. The
nature of underlying claims cannot be determined by a general
release that is broad and inclusive. Taggi v. United States, 835
F. Supp. 744, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd. 35 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir.
1994).
Under the flush language of section 104(a), amounts paid for
medical care attributable to emotional distress, however, may be
treated as damages received on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness. Petitioner has provided evidence
that 21 months after the signing of the settlement agreement, she
was referred to a psychiatrist with a diagnosis of anxiety
disorder and “panic attack”. However, she has failed to prove
any connection between the discrimination charges and the
disorder. See Goode v. Commissioner, supra. Even if the Court
were to assume, which the Court does not, that there is a causal
relationship between the event and the disorder, petitioner has
not shown that any of the amounts paid to her by Associates was
for the cost of her medical care. See id.
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