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3. Petitioner’s Other “Equitable Facts”
Petitioner argues that respondent abused his discretion by
failing to consider the other “equitable facts” of this case.
Petitioner’s “equitable facts” include reference to: (1)
Petitioner’s reliance on Bales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-
568;13 (2) petitioner’s reliance on Hoyt’s enrolled agent status;
(3) Hoyt’s criminal conviction; (4) Hoyt’s fraud on petitioner;
and (5) other letters and cases. The basic thrust of
petitioner’s argument is that he was defrauded by Hoyt and that,
if he were held responsible for penalties and interest incurred
as a result of his investment in a tax shelter, it would be
inequitable and against public policy. Petitioner’s argument is
not persuasive.
While the regulations do not set forth a specific standard
for evaluating an offer-in-compromise based on claims of public
policy or equity, the regulations contain two examples. See sec.
13 Bales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-568, involved
deficiencies determined against various investors in several Hoyt
partnerships. This Court found in favor of the investors on
several issues, stating that “the transaction in issue should be
respected for Federal income tax purposes.” Taxpayers in many
Hoyt-related cases have used Bales as the basis for a reasonable
cause defense to accuracy-related penalties. This argument has
been uniformly rejected by this Court and by the Courts of
Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Mortensen
v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d 375, 390-391 (6th Cir. 2006), affg.
T.C. Memo. 2004-279; Van Scoten v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 1243,
1254-1256 (10th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-275; Sanders v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-163; Hansen v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2004-269.
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