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requirement that the Commissioner has discretion to waive.
However, regardless of this semantic difference, we focus our
criticism of the Commissioner’s position on his adoption of a
bright-line rule requiring a bond or lien in every case.
We are aware that a narrow construction should be applied to
the deferral benefit provisions of section 6166. Estate of Bell
v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949), and Helvering
v. Nw. Steel Rolling Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940)), affg. 92
T.C. 714 (1989). However, even the strictest construction of
section 6166 does not give the Commissioner the authority to
impose a mandatory bond requirement without exercising any
discretion. Imposing such a requirement in every case would
rewrite the statute to make a bond a substantive requirement of
section 6166, which Congress did not intend. The deliberate
decision to incorporate section 6165 in such an intricate manner,
rather than simply make a bond requirement part of the
substantive requirements of the election, evidences that Congress
did not intend to make the securing of a bond or a special lien a
requirement in every case.
D. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 6166 shows that Congress
did not envision a mandatory bond requirement. Congress enacted
section 6166 because the existing law was “inadequate to deal
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