- 8 -
she had the requisite profit objective.10 Rule 142(a); Keanini
v. Commissioner, supra at 46; Hastings v. Commissioner, supra.
The regulations set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors
that may be considered in deciding whether a profit objective
exists. These factors include such matters as: The manner in
which the taxpayer carries on the activity, the taxpayer’s
history of income or losses with respect to the activity, and the
financial status of the taxpayer. See sec. 1.183-2(b), Income
Tax Regs.
No single factor, not even the existence of a majority of
factors favoring or disfavoring the existence of a profit
objective, is controlling. See id. In addition, not every
factor is relevant in every case.11 Vandeyacht v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1994-148; Borsody v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-
534, affd. per curiam 92 F.3d 1176 (4th Cir. 1996). Rather, the
relevant facts and circumstances of the case are determinative.
10 Generally the Commissioner’s determinations are presumed
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving those
determinations wrong. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933). Under sec. 7491, the burden of proof may shift from the
taxpayer to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces credible
evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to
ascertaining the taxpayer’s tax liability. Sec. 7491(a)(1). In
this case there is no such shift because petitioner neither
alleged that sec. 7491 was applicable nor established that he
fully complied with the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). The
burden of proof remains on petitioner.
11 Consequently, we do not analyze in depth all of the
factors enumerated in the regulation but rather focus on some of
the more important ones that lead to our decision.
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