Steven Rudolph Kaldi - Page 8
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Further, “an individual shall not be considered to be
disabled unless he furnishes proof of the existence” of his
disability. Sec. 72(m)(7). Petitioner offered a medical
benefits card issued by the Veterans’ Administration and some
brief testimony, neither of which rises to a level sufficient to
meet the standard required by the Internal Revenue Code. See
sec. 72(m)(7); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).
Petitioner also claimed “this Tax Court has previously ruled
on my late filings and accepted my disability.” But the issue of
petitioner’s disability has never been litigated and decided by
this Court; rather, in petitioner’s prior proceeding at docket
No. 1093-04S (regarding taxable year 1999), the Court merely
entered a decision pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
See United States v. Intl. Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505 (1953)
(only judgments on matters actually litigated between the parties
are conclusive in another action); Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C.
162, 166-167 (1988) (discussing the requirements for collateral
estoppel), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990); Hart Metal Prods.
Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-164 (holding that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when a decision of
the Court constitutes only a pro forma acceptance of the parties’
agreement), affd. 437 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1971).
Without more persuasive documentation to support
petitioner’s claim of disability, and without evidence that the
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Last modified: November 10, 2007