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V. Standard of Deference Due to General Findings of Fact and
Credibility Determinations Contained in the STJ Report
It is well settled that findings of fact and credibility
determinations made by the judicial officer who presided over the
trial of a case are presumed to be correct. Rule 183(d); Ballard
v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005) (and cases cited therein).
The axiom that deference must be given to the trial judge’s
findings of fact is rooted in the view that the trial judge (1)
is uniquely positioned to evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
(2) brings experience and expertise to the fact-finding process,
and (3) is normally the person most familiar with the record in a
case. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575, 580
(1985); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), Advisory Committee Notes (1985
amendment).
As previously discussed, the Courts of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit remanded the Ballard and
Lisle cases to this Court and directed that the recommended
findings of fact in the STJ report are presumed to be correct
“unless manifestly unreasonable”. Respondent concedes that,
although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not
articulate a particular standard for review in its remand of the
Kanter cases, the Court should apply the same “manifestly
unreasonable” standard in all of the cases consolidated herein.
Although respondent disagrees that the “manifestly unreasonable”
standard is the appropriate standard to be applied under new Rule
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