Denis M. Katchmeric - Page 8




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          decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a spouse to            
          make payments for the support or maintenance of the other spouse.           
          Sec. 71(b)(2).  No decree (or order) by the Circuit Court of                
          Fairfax County was in effect when petitioner made his payments to           
          Ms. Deluca in 2002.  Thus, we must decide whether there was a               
          written separation agreement in effect before January 24, 2003,             
          when the pendente lite order fixing spousal support was entered             
          by that court.                                                              
               The term “written separation agreement” is not defined in              
          the Internal Revenue Code, the applicable regulations, or in the            
          legislative history.  Bogard v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 97, 100               
          (1972).  A written separation agreement is a clear, written                 
          statement of the terms of support for separated parties.  In                
          Bogard v. Commissioner, supra at 101, we stated:                            
                    Logically, it appears Congress was interested in a                
               clear statement in written form of the terms of support                
               where the parties are separated.  In this manner it is                 
               administratively convenient for the Commissioner to                    
               apprise himself of the amount of gross income to the                   
               wife and the corresponding deduction allowable to the                  
               husband. * * *                                                         
          See also Leventhal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-92; Ewell v.            
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-253.                                          
               Letters which do not show a meeting of the minds between the           
          parties cannot collectively constitute a written separation                 
          agreement.  Grant v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 809, 822-823 (1985),             
          affd. without published opinion 800 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1986).               
          However, we have recognized that where one spouse assents in                





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