Cheryl Kunsman - Page 12

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          return.  Sec. 6015(c)(3)(C).  Respondent must demonstrate by a              
          preponderance of the evidence that petitioner had “an actual and            
          clear awareness (as opposed to reason to know) of the existence             
          of an item which gives rise to the deficiency (or portion                   
          thereof)”.  Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at 195; Charlton v.             
          Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 341-342.                                          
               As discussed above, we have found that petitioner had actual           
          knowledge of the IRA distribution.  Therefore, petitioner is not            
          eligible for relief under section 6015(c).7                                 
               Section 6015(f)                                                        
               Where relief is unavailable under section 6015(b) or (c),              
          section 6015(f) grants the Commissioner discretion to relieve an            
          individual from joint liability if it is inequitable to hold the            
          individual liable, taking into account all the facts and                    
          circumstances.  Sec. 6015(f).  As discussed above, petitioner is            
          not entitled to relief under section 6015(b) or (c).                        
               Petitioner bears the burden of proving that respondent                 
          abused his discretion in denying relief under section 6015(f).              
          Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d            
          1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at 198;              
          Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 292.                                    

               7 Petitioner testified that her former spouse became violent           
          at the end of their marriage in late 2001, but she did not                  
          demonstrate that her signing the 1999 joint return in 2000 was              
          anything but voluntary.  Therefore, the exception for duress in             
          sec. 6015(c)(3)(C) does not apply.                                          

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