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Ovation. Under the circumstances, respondent was permitted by
the statute and regulations to mail the FPAA to petitioner, an
indirect partner of Ovation, rather than to CM Trust, the direct
partner through which petitioner held his interest in Ovation.
See Crowell v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 683, 692-693 (1994). We
conclude that the FPAA respondent mailed to petitioner at his
reported address met the notice requirement of section 6223(a) by
virtue of section 6223(c)(3).
Petitioner seeks a contrary conclusion, arguing that CM
Trust is a complex trust rather than a grantor trust and that a
complex trust is not a “pass-thru partner” within the meaning of
section 6223(c)(3). We consider this argument unavailing. For
purposes of section 6223(c)(3), section 6231(a)(9) plainly
defines the term “pass-thru partner” to include a “trust” that
holds an interest in a partnership. We read nothing in the
relevant provisions that expresses a legislative intent to limit
that definition to any particular type of trust. Moreover, under
the facts at hand, petitioner stated affirmatively on his
personal income tax return that CM Trust was his grantor trust,
and those statements were corroborated by the like position taken
by CM Trust on its trust tax return. Thus, even if a distinction
between a grantor trust and a complex trust was important in the
application of section 6223(c)(3), a conclusion that we do not
reach but which we discuss for purposes of completeness, we would
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