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of the business premises of the employer.” In turn, section
119(c)(2) provides that a “camp” constitutes lodging that is:
(A) provided by or on behalf of the employer for
the convenience of the employer because the place at
which such individual renders services is in a remote
area where satisfactory housing is not available on the
open market,
(B) located, as near as practicable, in the
vicinity of the place at which such individual renders
services, and
(C) furnished in a common area (or enclave) which
is not available to the public and which normally
accommodates 10 or more employees.
Respondent does not dispute that the requirements of section
119(c)(2)(A) and (B) are satisfied in the instant case. However,
respondent contends that petitioner’s lodging did not constitute
a “camp” within the meaning of section 119(c) because
petitioner’s lodging did not satisfy the third requirement of
section 119(c)(2); i.e., that the lodging be “furnished in a
common area (or enclave) which is not available to the public and
which normally accommodates 10 or more employees.” Sec.
119(c)(2)(C). We agree.
Granted, petitioner’s lodging was not available to the
public in that petitioner’s specific housing unit was not
available for private ownership and its occupancy was restricted
to personnel who worked at Pine Gap. However, the lodging was
furnished in a common area that was accessible to the public, as
demonstrated by the fact that the lodging was located within the
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