James A. Nielsen - Page 13




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          of the business premises of the employer.”  In turn, section                
          119(c)(2) provides that a “camp” constitutes lodging that is:               
                    (A) provided by or on behalf of the employer for                  
               the convenience of the employer because the place at                   
               which such individual renders services is in a remote                  
               area where satisfactory housing is not available on the                
               open market,                                                           
                    (B) located, as near as practicable, in the                       
               vicinity of the place at which such individual renders                 
               services, and                                                          
                    (C) furnished in a common area (or enclave) which                 
               is not available to the public and which normally                      
               accommodates 10 or more employees.                                     
               Respondent does not dispute that the requirements of section           
          119(c)(2)(A) and (B) are satisfied in the instant case.  However,           
          respondent contends that petitioner’s lodging did not constitute            
          a “camp” within the meaning of section 119(c) because                       
          petitioner’s lodging did not satisfy the third requirement of               
          section 119(c)(2); i.e., that the lodging be “furnished in a                
          common area (or enclave) which is not available to the public and           
          which normally accommodates 10 or more employees.”  Sec.                    
          119(c)(2)(C).  We agree.                                                    
               Granted, petitioner’s lodging was not available to the                 
          public in that petitioner’s specific housing unit was not                   
          available for private ownership and its occupancy was restricted            
          to personnel who worked at Pine Gap.  However, the lodging was              
          furnished in a common area that was accessible to the public, as            
          demonstrated by the fact that the lodging was located within the            







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