Patrick G. & Valerie V. O'Malley - Page 44




                                        - 44 -                                         
          ment, the application of certain well-established principles36 to            
          the facts and circumstances surrounding the December 2, 1999                 
          transaction supports the conclusion that that transaction was not            
          a sale of lot 5 when it occurred.  Therefore, according to peti-             
          tioners, they had substantial authority when they filed their                
          1999 return for not reporting the December 2, 1999 transaction as            
          a sale in that return.37                                                     
               We reject petitioners’ substantial authority argument.  The             
          problem with that argument is that petitioners have failed to                
          carry their burden of establishing, let alone by strong proof,               
          the facts and circumstances that they contend surrounded the                 


               36The well-established principles on which petitioners rely             
          are the principles that we concluded are applicable in determin-             
          ing whether the December 2, 1999 transaction and the June 14,                
          2000 transaction constitute sales for tax purposes.  Those                   
          principles are:  (1) The key in determining whether a transaction            
          is a sale for tax purposes is whether the benefits and burdens of            
          ownership have passed, Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commis-                 
          sioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237 (1981); and (2) a taxpayer may attempt            
          to disregard the form of a transaction as not reflective of its              
          substance, but must present strong proof to do so, see Ill. Power            
          Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1417, 1434 (1986).                              
               37On brief, petitioners appear to suggest at times that they            
          had substantial authority only to support their position with                
          respect to “that part of the [December 2,] 1999 transaction in               
          excess of the $200,000.00 first mortgage loan amount.”  Thus,                
          petitioners seem to take inconsistent positions on brief with                
          respect to the accuracy-related penalty that respondent deter-               
          mined for 1999.  Regardless whether petitioners intend petition-             
          ers’ substantial authority argument to pertain to the entire                 
          December 2, 1999 transaction or to be limited to “that part of               
          the 1999 transaction in excess of the $200,000.00 first mortgage             
          loan amount”, for the reasons set forth below, we reject that                
          argument.                                                                    






Page:  Previous  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  Next 

Last modified: November 10, 2007