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payment as part of the division of marital property does not,
however, preclude the payment from being alimony. See Benedict
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 573, 577 (1984) (stating that “labels
attached to payments mandated by a decree of divorce or marriage
settlement agreement are not controlling”). While the
designation need not mimic the statutory language of sections 71
and 215, the requirements of subparagraph (B) will generally be
met if there is no “clear, explicit and express direction” in the
divorce decree stating that the payment is not to be treated as
alimony. See Estate of Goldman v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 317,
323 (1999), affd. without published opinion sub nom. Schutter v.
Commissioner, 242 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 2000). The divorce decree
does not contain such language. Accordingly, the retirement
payments meet the requirements of section 71(b)(1)(B).
Section 71(b)(1)(D) provides that there must be no liability
for the payor to make such payments, or for the payor to make
substitute payments, after the death of the payee spouse.
Respondent contends that the retirement payments fail to meet the
requirements of section 71(b)(1)(D) because the divorce decree
does not state whether such payments will terminate upon the
death of Ms. Holdman. In 1986, Congress amended section
71(b)(1)(D), specifically to remove the requirement that a
divorce instrument expressly state that the liability terminates
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