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intervene before the dependent returns to the
taxpayer's household is not sufficient to make such
absence permanent. [1966-1 C.B. at 32.]
The Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 66-28, supra, thus eschewed
reliance on any reasonable assumption of return standard in the
case of absences due to extended illness and instead emphasized
the absence of intent on the part of the taxpayer or dependent to
change the dependent's place of abode.
As the dissenting opinion points out, the “temporary absence
due to special circumstances” provisions in the head of household
regulations addressed in Hein contain the requirement that it be
“reasonable to assume that the [absent] taxpayer or * * * [absent
occupant of the taxpayer's household] will return to the
household”, whereas the “temporary absence due to special
circumstances” provisions in the dependency exemption regulations
construed in Rev. Rul. 66-28, supra, contain no such provision.
The dissenting opinion argues that this distinguishes Rev. Rul.
66-28, supra, from the instant case, which involves the head of
household regulations. I disagree. There is no indication in
Rev. Rul. 66-28, supra, that the Commissioner was seeking to
distinguish the rules applicable to temporary absences due to
illness in the case of the dependency exemption regulations
versus the head of household regulations. To the contrary, the
ruling characterizes the two regulations as “identical”, thereby
minimizing the significance of the reasonable assumption of
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