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Petitioners’ claim that this Court has jurisdiction centers
on the continuing validity, in their view, of their first request
for a section 6330 hearing. Petitioners posit that they withdrew
their first request for a section 6330 hearing only because they
had obtained an installment agreement with respondent; once
respondent had terminated the installment agreement
(unjustifiably so, according to petitioners), petitioners’ first
request for a section 6330 hearing was revived. Petitioners then
assert that as they were entitled to a section 6330 hearing but
were instead given an equivalent hearing, respondent’s decision
letter (issued as a consequence of the equivalent hearing) was a
“determination” for purposes of section 6330 and thus this Court
has jurisdiction.
Respondent’s position is that petitioners’ first request for
a section 6330 hearing, having been withdrawn by petitioners,
became ineffective and was not resuscitated by the termination of
the installment agreement. Petitioners’ second request for a
section 6330 hearing, according to respondent, constituted a
request for an equivalent hearing (because it was not a timely
request for a section 6330 hearing), which respondent duly
conducted. Thus, respondent asserts, the equivalent hearing gave
rise to a decision letter, which is not a “determination” under
section 6330. We agree with respondent.
The withdrawal of a request for a section 6330 hearing
constitutes an exception to the general rule requiring a hearing
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Last modified: November 10, 2007