Larry J. and Sherilyn Wadsworth - Page 14

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          creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.”                 
          Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).            
          In Durham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-125, we rejected a               
          taxpayer’s argument that Congress unfairly discriminated between            
          similarly situated taxpayers by making the interest abatement               
          provisions of newly amended section 6404(e) effective only for              
          interest accruing with respect to deficiencies or payments for              
          tax years beginning after enactment of that section and not to              
          all instances of managerial errors committed after amendment of             
          section 6404(e).  In Durham we stated:                                      
               judicial deference [to statutory classifications] flows                
               from a recognition that--as a practical matter--                       
               Congress will often have to draw distinctions between                  
               different taxpayers who seem in some ways to be in                     
               similar positions.  “No scheme of taxation, whether the                
               tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of                    
               goods and services, has yet been devised which is free                 
               of all discriminatory impact.”  As with laws granting                  
               economic benefits, drawing distinctions “inevitably                    
               requires that some persons who have an almost equally                  
               strong claim to favored treatment be placed on                         
               different sides of the [same] line . . . .”  Yet courts                
               have repeatedly held that these distinctions do not                    
               violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal                          
               protection.  Instead they reflect Congress’s exercise                  
               of its legitimate prerogative to enact laws with an eye                
               to their practical administration and cost to the fisc.                
          Id. (fn. refs. and citations omitted).  The distinction between a           
          “partnership” and a “small partnership” for purposes of section             
          6231(a)(1)(B) does not impinge upon a fundamental right or use a            
          suspect classification and must therefore be upheld if it has any           

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