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Petitioner argues that we should do this, in particular, because
“she would not have waived a jury if she had known” otherwise.
These arguments summarize the contradictory and misguided
approach which petitioner advances throughout the entirety of her
case; the operative divorce decree specifically states that both
petitioner and Mr. Poe are to remain jointly and severally liable
for any liability stemming from 2002, and a jury would only be a
possibility had petitioner paid the tax due and then filed a
claim for refund, and if denied, sued in District Court. There
are no jury trials in the Tax Court, and we cannot entertain
petitioner’s insinuation that we should be compelled to find, as
a jury might, in her favor as a matter of equity.
As to the fifth factor, petitioner received a substantial
benefit in that she did not pay any of the amount of underpayment
from 2002.
Finally, and with respect to the sixth factor, the record is
silent as to whether petitioner has made a good faith effort to
comply with income tax laws in taxable years following the year
in issue. Therefore, we consider this factor neutral.
Petitioner’s failure to satisfy the seven threshold
conditions set forth in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, and all
but one of the factors in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, is
determinative. On these facts and circumstances, the Court holds
that there was no abuse of discretion by respondent in denying
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