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requested of Mr. Nelson and (2) the fact that counsel’s
declaration did “not contain any relevant facts and is
essentially an untimely presentation of additional argument in
opposition to Participating Partner’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.” We now address respondent’s suggestion, in connection
with that motion, that Rule 121(e) provides grounds for the
denial of the instant motion.
In her prior declaration, respondent’s counsel alleges the
existence of “discoverable facts sufficient to raise or further
support the existence of * * * material issues of fact”. She
argues that “[d]iscovery from and cross examination of” Mr. Winn,
his partners and employees, AIG, and Stone Ends are “necessary to
secure complete information regarding the purpose and effect of
the transaction * * * the reason for the 5-percent transfer
between Winn and Curtis * * * [and] whether there was an
agreement regarding the sale of * * * [the Manchester property]
prior to the date of the purchase agreement and at the time of
the transaction in dispute.”
As discussed supra, (1) participating partner concedes that
the “purpose” of the transactions at issue was tax minimization,
a concession that does not result in a denial of the motion; (2)
the 5-percent transfer from Mr. Winn to Mr. Curtis does not
affect the tax results of the transactions at issue and is,
therefore, not material; and (3) there would be no adverse impact
upon participating partner’s position were we to find that there
was an informal (unwritten) agreement, in 2000, regarding the
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