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balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with
petitioners’ legitimate concern that respondent’s collection be
no more intrusive than necessary.
In reviewing whether respondent’s Appeals Office abused its
discretion in sustaining respondent’s notice of intent to levy,
our analysis is governed by “general principles of contract law.”
See Dutton v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 133, 138 (2004).
Under the “material breach of contract” analysis applied in
Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 108 (2004), revd. 439
F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), “If * * * [petitioners’] breach is
material and sufficiently serious, * * * [respondent’s]
obligation to perform may be discharged. * * * Not so, however,
if * * * [petitioners’] breach is comparatively minor.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted
that the failure to comply with an express condition of an OIC is
itself grounds for the Commissioner to revoke the OIC, regardless
of materiality. Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d at 462.
Generally, for purposes of section 6330, a notice mailed to
the taxpayer’s “last known address” is proper and sufficient.
Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1985); Buffano
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-32. In determining petitioners’
last known address, unless otherwise notified respondent may rely
upon petitioners’ most recently filed return. See Abeles v.
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Last modified: March 27, 2008