Cite as: 502 U. S. 197 (1991)
Opinion of the Court
on many occasions, "the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts." Will, 491 U. S., at 63-64, citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 9, n. 7 (1980); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 420-421 (1979).
The issue becomes, then, a pure question of statutory construction, where the doctrine of stare decisis is most compelling. Respondent argues, and the state courts in this case said, that the statutory-construction holding of Parden is no longer good law because of our later opinion in Will, supra. Respondent would make the result in Will solely a function of our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, reading the case to adopt a per se rule prohibiting the interpretation of general liability language to include the States, absent a clear statement by Congress to the effect that Congress intends to subject the States to the cause of action. Respondent argues that in light of Will, the same considerations which led us to a partial overruling of Parden in Welch should govern here.
We think the argument misconstrues the Will decision. Will did not import the entirety of our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence into the area of statutory construction. It treated the Eleventh Amendment as a relevant consideration. 491 U. S., at 66-67; Hafer v. Melo, 502 U. S. 21, 30 (1991). The primary focus of Will was, as it should have been, on the language and history of § 1983. 491 U. S., at 64, 68-70; cf. Dellmuth v. Muth, supra, at 229-230. If Will had adopted a per se rule of the sort advocated by respondent, that entire discussion would have been unnecessary. The issue in Will and in this case is different from the issue in our Eleventh Amendment cases in a fundamental respect: The latter cases involve the application of a rule of constitutional law, while the former cases apply an "ordinary rule of statutory construction." Will, supra, at 65. This
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