Cite as: 502 U. S. 224 (1991)
Stevens, J., dissenting
The District Court denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity because it decided that further factfinding was necessary. On such a motion, the court was of course required to resolve any disputed question of fact against the moving parties. In my opinion the Court of Appeals correctly stated the governing standards when it wrote:
"Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the government official bears the burden of proof. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, [457 U. S. 800, 815 (1982)], Benigni v. City of Hemet, 853 F. 2d 1519, 1525 (9th Cir. 1988). As with all summary judgment motions, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Bryant as the nonmoving party; to prevail on their motion for summary judgment, the defendants must show that they were reasonable in their belief that they had probable cause. Bryant, however, bears the burden of proving that the right which the defendants allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of their conduct. . . .
. . . . . ". . . In order for a secret service agent reasonably to have believed he had cause to arrest Bryant, the agent must have been reasonable in his belief that Bryant's words and the context in which he delivered them were a serious threat against the president. Watts v. United States, [394 U. S. 705 (1969) (per curiam)].
. . . . . "Whether a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment or a directed verdict in a § 1983 action based on lack of probable cause is proper only if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach. Kennedy v. L. A. Police Department, 887 F. 2d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1989), McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F. 2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984). Because qualified immunity protects government officials from suit as well as from
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