242 IN RE BLODGETT
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
vide a completely satisfactory explanation for their July 1990 decision to defer ruling on the merits of the petition— namely, their desire to avoid piecemeal litigation and to address all of Campbell's claims in a single ruling. Because that explanation alone is sufficient to mandate denial of the State's petition, there was no occasion for the panel to explain its pre-July 1990 delay.
The panel's decision to defer its ruling on the second habeas petition pending disposition of the third personal restraint petition filed in the Washington Supreme Court in July 1990 showed proper respect for that court. Although this Court expresses its concern about the State's interest in expediting its execution of Campbell, the Court is notably silent about the fact that the Washington Supreme Court considered the claims Campbell raised in his third personal restraint petition to be substantial. Although the state court, over the dissent of Justice Utter, denied Campbell's petition, that court appointed counsel, scheduled briefing, heard oral argument, and addressed the merits of Campbell's several claims. On these facts, the Ninth Circuit's decision to delay its ruling on Campbell's second habeas petition was sound, for it enables that court to consider the entire case at one time and will not delay the ultimate disposition of the matter.2
Although I am sure the Court did not intend to send such a message, its opinion today may be read as an open invitation to petitions for mandamus from every State in which a federal court has stayed an execution. This is unfortunate because, as we noted in Kerr v. United States District Court
2 On the facts of this case, the "severe prejudice" perceived by the Court is illusory. Even were we to direct the Ninth Circuit to decide Campbell's second petition, the State would still be required to wait until that court ruled on his third petition. The State seems to recognize as much, for it asks that we both direct the Ninth Circuit to decide the second habeas petition and vacate the August 7 order which permitted filing of the third habeas petition. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus 9.
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