274
Opinion of Blackmun, J.
3. In any event, if "strangeness" is the benchmark of what Congress unmistakably intends, I find it stranger still to presume that Congress intends States to tax—and, as in these cases, foreclose upon—Indian-owned reservation lands. This presumption does not account for Congress' "abrupt" termination of the assimilationist policies of the Dawes Act in favor of the Indian Reorganization Act's now well-established "principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance." See ante, at 255.
The Court announces that the Yakima's "policy objections do not belong in this forum." Ante, at 265. Yet, not to consider the policies of the Indian Reorganization Act is to forget that "we previously have construed the effect of legislation affecting reservation Indians in light of 'intervening' legislative enactments." Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 386 (1976). See also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 479 (1976) (noting that State's interpretation of § 6 of the Dawes Act cannot survive "the many and complex intervening jurisdictional statutes" subsequently enacted). The majority appears to assume that these intervening enactments need not be given any effect here, because they do not rise to the level of a "repeal" of the Dawes and Burke Acts. Ante, at 262. I agree with the majority that implied repeals are not favored. But this is beside the point. A "repeal"—whether express or implied— need not be shown to preclude the States from taxing Indian lands.
As in all state-Indian jurisdiction cases, the relevant inquiry is whether Congress has pre-empted state law, not whether it has repealed its own law. See, e. g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202, 216 (1987); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S., at 376, n. 2. Under established principles of pre-emption, and notwithstanding the majority's derisive characterizations, see ante, at 264-265, state laws may in fact give way to "mere" federal policies and interests. See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990) (state law is pre-empted to the extent that it
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