INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 13 (1992)

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326

INS v. DOHERTY

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

1115. But the regulation here in question, 8 CFR § 3.2 (1987), provides in part that motions to reopen in deportation proceedings "shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . ." The Court of Appeals seized upon a sentence in our opinion in Abudu stating that the issue in such a proceeding is whether the alien has "reasonably explained his failure to apply for asylum initially" and has indeed offered "previously unavailable, material evidence," Abudu, 485 U. S., at 104-105, as negating a requirement of unforeseeability. But this sentence, we think, cannot bear that construction, particularly when the same opinion sets out verbatim the applicable regulation quoted above. It is not at all uncommon to require that motions to reopen proceedings be based on matter which could not reasonably have been previously adduced; see, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2) ("newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) . . ."). We hold, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Attorney General, that it was well within his broad discretion in considering motions to reopen to decide that the material adduced by respondent could have been foreseen or anticipated at the time of the earlier proceeding.9 The alien, as we discuss more fully in Part III, infra, is allowed to plead inconsist-9 The Court of Appeals, 908 F. 2d 1108, 1115-1116 (CA2 1990), and Justice Scalia, post, at 338-339, suggest that the Attorney General's denial of respondent's designation of Ireland was not even foreseeable at the time of the deportation hearing. Given the statutory language of 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a) and the position taken by the INS at the deportation hearing, we find it unrealistic to assume that respondent was unaware of the possibility that his designation of Ireland might prove ineffective notwithstanding the fact that Ireland was willing to receive him. The Attorney General certainly does not abuse his discretion in failing to take such a view of the events in this case.

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