Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 16 (1992)

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382

RUFO v. INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL

Opinion of the Court

Petitioner Rufo urges that these factors are present in the cases before us and support modification of the decree. He asserts that modification would actually improve conditions for some pretrial detainees, who now cannot be housed in the Suffolk County Jail and therefore are transferred to other facilities, farther from family members and legal counsel. In these transfer facilities, petitioners assert that detainees may be double celled under less desirable conditions than those that would exist if double celling were allowed at the new Suffolk County Jail. Petitioner Rufo also contends that the public interest is implicated here because crowding at the new facility has necessitated the release of some pretrial detainees and the transfer of others to halfway houses, from which many escape.

For the District Court, these points were insufficient reason to modify under Rule 60(b)(5) because its "authority [was] limited by the established legal requirements for modification . . . ." 734 F. Supp., at 566. The District Court, as noted above, also held that the suggested modification would not be proper even under the more flexible standard that is followed in some other Circuits. None of the changed circumstances warranted modification because it would violate one of the primary purposes of the decree, which was to provide for "[a] separate cell for each detainee [which] has always been an important element of the relief sought in this litigation—perhaps even the most important element." Id., at 565. For reasons appearing later in this opinion, this was not an adequate basis for denying the requested modification. The District Court also held that Rule 60(b)(6) provided no more basis for relief. The District Court, and the Court of Appeals as well, failed to recognize that such rigidity is neither required by Swift nor appropriate in the context of institutional reform litigation.

It is urged that any rule other than the Swift "grievous wrong" standard would deter parties to litigation such as this from negotiating settlements and hence destroy the util-

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