512
Stevens, J., dissenting
occasions since 1975,3 the Department of Justice has refused to preclear changes in the power of elected officials that had a potentially discriminatory 4 impact on black voters. The Department has routinely precleared numerous other transfers of authority after determining that they had no discriminatory purpose or effect.5 There is no evidence that the pre-3 The Solicitor General has advised us that the Department has objected to the following transfers of authority: "(1) Mobile, Alabama, March 2, 1976, involving a transfer of administrative duties from the entire commission to individual commissioners; (2) Charleston, South Carolina, June 14, 1977, involving a transfer of taxing authority from the legislative delegation to the county council; (3) Edge-field County, South Carolina, February 8, 1979, involving a transfer of increased taxing power to the county council; (4) Colleton County, South Carolina, September 4, 1979, involving a transfer of authority to tax for school purposes from the legislative delegation to the county council; (5) Brunswick and Blynn County, Georgia, August 16, 1982, involving the abolition of separate city and county commissions and the transfer of their powers to a consolidated commission; (6) Hillsborough County, Florida, August 29, 1984, involving a transfer of power over municipalities from the legislative delegation to the county commission (objection was withdrawn because the county made clear that it did not intend to effect such a transfer); (7) Waycross, Georgia, February 16, 1988, involving a change in the duties of the mayor; and (8) San Patricio, Texas, May 7, 1990, involving a transfer of voter registration duties from the county clerk to the county tax assessor." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 6.
4 Whether a change in "any . . . standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, must be precleared under § 5 depends, not on whether the change "resulted in impairment of the right to vote, or whether [it was] intended to have that effect," but rather, on "whether the challenged alteration has the potential for discrimination." NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U. S. 166, 181 (1985); see McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 250, n. 17 (1984); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 42 (1978) (issue "is not whether the provision is in fact innocuous and likely to be approved, but whether it has a potential for discrimination"); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 534 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 383-385 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 555, n. 19, 558-559 (1969).
5 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-17.
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