Cite as: 502 U. S. 46 (1991)
Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment
The Court rightly observes that "it would generally be preferable" for the trial court to remove unsupported theories from the jury's consideration. See ante, at 60. I would also note that the Government had two other means of avoiding the possibility, however remote, that petitioner was convicted on a theory for which there was insufficient evidence: The Government either could have charged the two objectives in separate counts, or agreed to petitioner's request for special interrogatories. The Court wisely rejects, albeit silently, the Government's argument that these practices, but not the complex and voluminous proof, would likely have confused the jury. I would go further than the Court and commend these techniques to the Government for use in complex conspiracy prosecutions.
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