144
Opinion of the Court
inary fact-finding" to determine "whether there is a possible Bivens cause of action." Ibid. Accordingly, " '[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could not award money damages . . . , administrative consideration of the possibility of corrective action and a record would have aided a court in measuring liability and determining the extent of the damages.' " Ibid., quoting Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F. 2d 27, 29 (CA6 1982) (emphasis in original). Exhaustion of the general grievance procedure was required notwithstanding the fact that McCarthy's request was solely for money damages.
II
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one among related doctrines—including abstention, finality, and ripeness—that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking. Of "paramount importance" to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 501 (1982). Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 579 (1989); Patsy, 457 U. S., at 502, n. 4. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs. McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 483, n. 6 (1971). See also Patsy, 457 U. S., at 518 (White, J., concurring in part) ("[E]xhaustion is 'a rule of judicial administration,' . . . and unless Congress directs otherwise, rightfully subject to crafting by judges"). Nevertheless, even in this field of judicial discretion, appropriate deference to Congress' power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which a claim may be heard in a federal court requires fashioning of exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any applicable statutory scheme. Id., at 501-502, and n. 4.
A
This Court long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before
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